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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
DAVID E. BROWN : Case No. 870504-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and 
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief 
(Brief of Appellant at iv, 1-3). Mr. Brown takes this opportunity 
to reply to Respondent's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Theft crimes are not crimes of dishonesty or false 
statement under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Federal case law guides the interpretation of the Rules of Evidence 
and overwhelmingly indicates that the trial court erred 
prejudicially by ruling to admit prior theft convictions to impeach 
Mr. Brown. That ruling kept Mr. Brown from testifying on his own 
behalf in violation of his constitutional rights to do so. 
Prejudicial error occurs when a juror fails to answer a 
material question on voir dire examination and later deliberates 
using information which discloses the failure to have truthfully 
answered the voir dire question. Further, jurors may not deliberate 
before the case is submitted to them, nor may they presume the 
accused to be guilty. Reversible error occurred in Mr. Brown's case 
when the trial court refused to acknowledge the above errors and 
denied Mr. Brown's motion for a new trial, violating his due process 
rights and his constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial 
jury. 
ARGOMENT 
POINT I 
(Reply to Respondent's Point I) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
DENYING MR. BROWNfS PRETRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF MISDEMEANOR 
THEFT. 
The State mistakenly relies on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that theft crimes are crimes of 
dishonesty. Brief of Respondent at 7. The State v. Cintron per 
curiam opinion was decided under the old rules of evidence and does 
not reflect the new direction taken in Utah since adoption of the 
federal rules of evidence. Specifically, State v. Cintron is 
inconsistent with Rule 609's more narrow interpretation of 
"dishonesty." See Opening Brief of Appellant at 5-8. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that previous opinions which are 
inconsistent with the new direction taken since adopting the federal 
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rules are overruled. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 n. 40 
(Utah 1986). State v. Cintron is just such an opinion and therefore 
should be considered overruled. 
This analysis is buttressed by footnote 45 of State v. 
Banner where the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the 
prosecutor's reliance on case law established prior to Rule 609(a) 
at the trial level was significant—and presumably unpersuasive on 
appeal. Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Bar 
Commission's Rules Committee's Preliminary Note to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence indicate a serious commitment to using the adoption of the 
federal rules of evidence as a fresh starting place for the law of 
evidence in this state, taking aim at seeking uniformity between the 
rules by looking to the federal rules for interpretation. State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d at 1333-34. The State v. Cintron opinion violates 
this new direction and is inappropriately relied on by the State for 
its base proposition. 
Mr. Brown's reliance on State v. Banner, supra, and 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), is not intended to blur 
the (a)(1) and (a)(2) subsections of Rule 609 as implied by the 
State (Brief of Respondent at 7-8); rather, both cases were cited to 
demonstrate the Utah Supreme Court's posture since adopting the 
federal rules of evidence emphasizing the Court's expressed intent 
to rely on federal case law to guide the evidence rules questions. 
In State v. Banner, the Utah Supreme Court cited United States v. 
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for an historical perspective 
of the development of Rule 609(a). That historical review discloses 
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the congressional debate of the rule and the revisions undertaken 
prior to adopting the rule. 
Although United States v. Smith, supra, did involve 
crimes other than the theft crimes at issue in this case, United 
States v. Smith remains persuasive in deciding whether theft crimes 
are crimes of dishonesty or false statement as meant by Rule 
609(a)(2) because Smith speaks directly to the point of what 
Congress meant by the phrase, often citing the congressional 
record. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 7. United States v. 
Millings, 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976), similarly offers guidance 
to this Court despite a difference in the specific crimes being 
examined. Among many cases, United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 
188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978), directly indicates that robbery, 
burglary, and theft convictions are not included within the term 
"dishonesty or false statement" as meant by Rule 609(a)(2). See 
also United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), and 
Howard v. Gonzalez, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981), cited in 
Mr. Brown's opening brief. Opening Brief of Appellant at 8. 
United States v. Smith, supra, discloses the misplaced 
reliance by the state to the contrary, citing United States v. 
Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Ackridge, 
370 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.Pa. 1973); United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257 
(3rd Cir. 1972); and United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). Three of these four cases pre-date Congress' adoption 
of the federal rules of evidence. The fourth case, United States v. 
Bianco, supra, decided after the enactment of the federal rules, 
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relied only upon pre-federal rules cases. As the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court pointed out in United States v. Smith, supra, 
"[t]he simple answer to the government's argument is that none of 
these cases involved Rule 609." 551 F.2d at 364. The Smith court 
further explained that these opinions relying on pre-609 cases "are 
not controlling in this case and indeed are essentially 
irrelevant." _lc|* at 365. The enactment of the federal rules in 
1975, and their adoption in Utah in 1983, represented significant 
changes in the treatment of prior convictions as impeachment 
evidence. The burden shifted, the judge's discretion was altered, 
and the analysis is distinct. Cases predating these changes 
therefore do not offer helpful insights. The cases relied on in the 
State's brief are not persuasive. 
Finally, the State cites as supplemental authority a 
recent Washington case, State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 
P.2d (1988), to support their premise that theft crimes are 
crimes of dishonesty. While State v. Brown does indicate the 
Washington Supreme Court's position that theft crimes are crimes of 
dishonesty, the opinion jji toto supports the claims of our 
appellant, Mr. Brown. 
In State v. Brown, supra, the Washington Supreme Court 
overruled a prior decision, State v. Burton, 676 P.2d 975 (Wash. 
1984), which had patterned its decision after federal law. Burton, 
676 P.2d at 981. The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Brown, 
supra, recanted that earlier decision noting that, while their 
Evidence Rule 609(a) was also a verbatim replica of the federal 
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rule, Washington was free to interpret the language differently, 
reaching this decision, the Court stated: 
[0]ur heavy reliance in Burton upon federal 
legislative history and upon federal decisional 
law was misguided. When we sought to resolve the 
"confusion and controversy" as to whether theft 
crimes are within ER 609(a)(2) by examining 
federal law, we lost sight of basic principles we 
generally employ in construing rules we have 
authored. 
First, of course, is the principle that federal 
case law interpreting the federal rule is not 
binding upon this court. Simply because our rule 
is identical to the federal rule does not require 
us to interpret our rule in the same fashion, nor 
could it require us to do so. . . . 
Second, we have grave reservations about 
whether the federal courts' restrictive 
construction of Rule 609(a)(2) to exclude per se 
admissibility of prior theft convictions is 
analytically sound. As we have noted, the federal 
courts place great weight on the definition 
accorded the phrase "dishonesty or false 
statement" found in federal legislative history. 
We think that in relying upon the congressional 
committee reports' definition, courts have 
overlooked the language of the rule itself. The 
rule is stated in the disjunctive, "dishonest or 
false statement." . . . 
Rather than concentrating on federal 
interpretation of the federal rule, we will 
examine the meaning of ER 609(a)(2) without using 
federal case law and federal legislative.history 
as a starting point. 
State v. Brown, P.2d at (emphasis added). The reasoning 
employed by the Washington Supreme Court to support its deviation 
from the federal law is contrary to Utah's stated position and is 
therefore inappropriate support under both stated reasons. 
First, Utah, unlike Washington, expressed an intention 
from the outset of adopting the federal rules to seek uniformity 
with evidence law between the federal and Utah courts by explicit 
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directing Utah courts to look to federal decisions for guidance. 
State v. Bannery 717 P.2d 1333-34 (citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 
1313, 1317 (Utah 1986)); Preliminary Note, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983). 
Second, the Washington Supreme Court, both in State v, 
Burton, supra, and State v. Brown, supra, conceded that the 
overwhelming federal position is that theft crimes are not crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement as meant by Rule 609(a)(2). Burton, 
676 P.2d at 981; Brown, P.2d at . 
Accordingly, this Court should not deviate from the 
federal rules as did the Washington Supreme Court. This Court 
should find that theft is not a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement and that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying 
Mr. Brown's motion in limine to suppress the prior convictions. 
Mr. Brown's case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial 
where such prejudicial error does not occur. 
POINT II 
(Reply to Respondent's Points II and III) 
MR. BROWN DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL BY AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY AS GUARANTEED HIM BY BOTH THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
At issue in both Points II and III of Appellant's opening 
brief and the State's answer is whether Mr. Brown received his 
constitutionally guaranteed fair trial by an impartial jury. Fifth, 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution; 
Article I, Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution. The State answers 
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the issue in both points with claims that no error occurred, or that 
if error occurred it was harmless (Brief of Respondent at 9-22). The 
State further contends that Mr. Brown wasn't able to prove his 
assertions of error because the affidavits provided by his counsel 
were not established (Brief of Respondent at 10) and/or were 
actually stricken by the trial court (Brief of Respondent at 17). 
The State's position is without merit and must fail. 
First, the trial court refused to allow an inquiry into 
the nature of the statements which prompted the jury to send out the 
question, "Does statements made by jurors during recess that 
disturbed some members render our verdict invalid?" (R. 87, 155 at 
92). The trial court opted instead to merely admonish the jury to 
decide the case solely on the law and the evidence presented in 
court (R. 155 at 93). Such a belated admonition failed to protect 
Mr. Brown's right to an impartial jury. 
Case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Utah 
Supreme Court, and this Court, disclose the error of the trial judge 
and mandate reversal of Mr. Brown's conviction. 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. Fairness of course 
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of 
cases. But our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of 
unfairness . . . . [T]o perform its high function 
in the best way "justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice." 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965) (citing in part Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1955)). 
The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at 
the very heart of due process. [0]ur common-law 
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heritage, our Constitution, and our experience in 
applying that Constitution have committed us 
irrevocably to the position that the criminal 
trial has one well-defined purpose—to provide a 
fair and reliable determination of guilt. 
[A]lthough a juror may be sincere when he says 
that he was fair and impartial to the defendant, 
the psychological impact requiring such a 
declaration before one's fellows is often its 
father. It is the nature of the practices here 
challenged that proof of actual harm, or lack of 
harm, is virtually impossible to adduce. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)(citations and quotations 
omitted). 
The possibility that improper contacts may 
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even 
be able to recognize and that a defendant may be 
left with questions as to the impartiality of the 
jury, leads us to the conclusion that when the 
contact is more than incidental, the burden is on 
the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized 
contact did not influence the jury. 
Indeed, even if the jurors had denied they were 
influenced by the encounter in the post-trial 
hearing, that is not enough to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice. 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280-81 (Utah 1985). 
The Pike Court explained that "[a]nything more 
than the most incidental contact during the trial 
between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the 
impartiality of the jury and at best gives the 
appearance of the absence of impartiality." The 
Court stated that Utah has adopted a stringent 
rule that "prejudice may well exist even though a 
person who has been tainted may not himself, be 
able to recognize that fact." . . . The Court held 
[in Pike] the juror's denial of prejudice or 
influence was, therefore, insufficient to overcome 
the presumption, and the mistrial should have been 
granted. 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 96 (Utah App. 1987)(quoting State v. 
Pike, 712 p.2d at 279-80). 
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Accordingly, prejudicial error occurred in Mr. Brown's 
case when the trial judge refused to conduct an inquiry into the 
statements which the jurors themselves found to be troubling enough 
to ask whether their decision would be valid.1 That error was 
compounded when the trial judge denied the motion for a new trial 
which was supported by affidavits detailing the impermissible 
exchanges between jurors both before and during deliberations.2 The 
prejudice revealed and appropriately presumed from the question by 
the jury and/or the statements made by Juror Hogan cannot be 
rebutted by reliance upon either the belated group admonition given 
by the trial judge in response to the jury's question (R. 155 at 
93), nor the individual polling after pronouncement of the verdict 
(R. 155 at 96-97). See cases cited supra on this point. 
1
 Notably, in both State v. Pike, supra, and State v. 
Larocco, supra, the trial court held a hearing with the particular 
jurors and witnesses involved to determine what had occurred. Such 
a hearing was asked for and denied in the case at bar (R. 155 at 
92-93); the presumption for prejudice should therefore stand 
unrebutted in this case. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280, 
seemingly requiring an exhaustive inquiry; see also State v. 
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Utah 1988)(Stewart, J., dissenting 
opinion). 
2
 The affidavit of Juror Blain revealed (1) that Juror 
Hogan argued retail sales experience during deliberations when he 
had failed to acknowledge any such experience during voir dire, and 
(2) that statements derogatory to Mr. Brown had been exchanged 
between jurors before deliberations reflecting an attitude that 
Juror Hogan appeared to have predetermined Mr. Brown's guilt before 
the case had even been submitted to the jury (R. 138-39). 
Specifically, Juror Hogan had made a reference to the accused as 
"that black guy." He had also stated, "[S]he, [defense counsel], 
doesn't need to worry with that guy." At another point, he said, 
"Book 'em, Danno" in reference to Mr. Brown. (R. 156 at 7.) All 
these statements were understood by Juror Blain as indication that 
juror Hogan had predetermined Mr. Brown's guilt. 
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Second, the State maintains the trial court correctly 
struck the affidavits from use at the motion for a new trial. At the 
State's urging the court relied on Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence to strike the affidavits. Under the circumstances of the 
case, that ruling by the trial court was erroneous. Rule 606(b) may 
not apply at all to the facts of this case, and even if it does 
apply* the affidavit presented to the trial court fits within the 
expressed exception to the rule. 
As Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is a 
verbatim replica of the federal rule, federal intent and case law 
guides the proper interpretation. See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 
(Utah 1986); see also discussion in Point I, supra, at 2-6. The 
Conference Report to Rule 606(b) of the federal Rules of Evidence 
discusses both the House bill and Senate bill versions of the rule. 
The Conference Report then specifies: 
The Conference adopts the Senate amendment. The 
Conferees believe that jurors should be encouraged 
to be conscientious in properly reporting to the 
court misconduct that occurs during jury 
deliberations. 
Various federal courts have held that Rule 606(b) does not bar the 
introduction of statements which demonstrate the failure of a juror 
to answer material voir dire questions. Hard v. Burlington Northern 
Railroad, 812 F.2d 482, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1987)(statements which tend 
to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by Rule 606(b) and 
the court below abused its discretion in so ruling and in failing to 
hold a hearing to investigate that a juror failed to honestly answer 
a material voir dire question); Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific 
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Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1986)(no error was found 
because appellant did not allege that a juror failed to disclose 
important information during voir dire; giving false information or 
withholding information during voir dire is an exception to Rule 
606(b)). 
Howeverf even if the rule does applyf the affidavits 
presented in this case fit within the exception articulated within 
the rule itself. The rule states: 
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or 
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of 
a verdict or indictment/ a juror may not testify 
as to any matter or statement occurring during the 
course of the jury's deliberations or to the 
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's 
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to 
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection 
therewith/ except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor 
may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
him concerning a matter about which he would be 
precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. 
Rule 606(b)/ Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)(emphasis added). In this 
case Juror Hogan did not respond to any of the trial court's six 
different questions of whether the jurors had worked directly or 
indirectly in the retail sales business (R. 155 at 36-38). Juror 
Hogan thenf however/ argued to his fellow jurors by referring during 
deliberations to his prior employment in retail sales (R. 139). 
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As the crime charged against Mr, Brown was retail theft, 
the questions asked Juror Hogan were material. If he had answered 
the questions properly, Juror Hogan would have been subjected to 
follow-up questions and inquiries aimed at revealing any bias he may 
have had. When Juror Hogan failed to answer the questions but then 
utilized that experience to support his position in deliberations he 
frustrated the purpose of voir dire precluding possible challenges 
for cause or peremptory challenges. Any use of the information 
undisclosed to the court and counsel during voir dire is therefore 
extraneous information. See Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 
supra; and Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., supra. The 
statements of prior retail experiences by Juror Hogan in 
deliberations were improperly before the other jurors. Juror Blain 
recognized the inconsistency, and this Court should also conclude 
that Juror Hogan's arguments in deliberations were improperly before 
the jury, were prejudicial to Mr. Brown, and were extraneous as 
meant by the rule. Moreover, the action of Juror Hogan violated 
Mr. Brown's due process rights and his right to an impartial jury 
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.3 
3 The case at bar is distinct from State v. DeMille, 756 
P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), where the accused claimed error because jurors 
relied on personal experiences. In DeMille counsel for the accused 
declined to ask about such personal experiences which the Court 
characterized as "quite foreseeable." 756 P.2d at 83. In the case 
at bar the "quite foreseeable" inquiry at issue was asked of 
prospective jurors. Juror Hogan failed to answer that question 
(repeated six times) consistently with his deliberation statements. 
The implication of DeMille is that had the question been asked there 
and events proceeded as in this case error would have occurred. Id. 
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The affidavit of Juror Blain fits within the exception of 
Rule 606(b) and should have been accepted by the trial court. A 
ruling by this Court to the contrary subjects Rule 606(b) to an 
unconstitutional as applied challenge inasmuch as the rule must give 
way and fall when balanced against the constitutional rights, both 
federal and state, of Mr. Brown to due process and a fair trial by 
an impartial jury. This Court should accept the affidavits as 
admissible and probative evidence supporting the rebuttable 
presumption that Mr. Brown was prejudiced because he did not receive 
his fair trial at the hands of an impartial jury. 
Finally, the State contends that even if any errors 
occurred in this trial they were harmless because of the strength of 
the case against Mr. Brown. Brief of Respondent at 16-22. That 
claim is untenable on the facts of this case. The doctrine of 
harmless error, as provided in case law, is at its most stringent 
when examining violations of constitutional dimensions. Justice 
Zimmerman in his concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1988) , noted: 
This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the 
harmless error standard applicable to violations 
of the state constitution is the erosion of 
confidence standard or the stricter federal 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 
Id. at 500 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result)(citing State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204-05 & n.3 (Utah 1987)). Either standard 
adopted in Utah would require a finding that the errors herein were 
not harmless. 
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The facts of this case go much beyond the evidentiary 
errors discussed in State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987)(trial court erred in limiting defendant's cross-examination by 
misinterpreting rule of evidence but error was harmless); State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987)(the State committed reversible 
error by failing to provide requested discovery of two witnesses who 
gave unanticipated testimony); or State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 
(Utah 1986)(trial court erred in limiting cross examination for bias 
but error was harmless because jury was already aware of such 
bias). In this case, the errors are more than otherwise 
inadmissible evidence reaching the jury or evidence improperly 
excluded from the jury; the errors which occurred in this case go to 
the heart of Mr. Brown's constitutional rights to a fair trial by 
impartial jurors. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 
(1967)(citing cases indicating that some constitutional rights are 
so fundamental that their infraction can never be harmless error). 
Predeliberation statements such as "[S]he [defense 
counsel] doesn't need to worry with that guy," "that black guy," and 
"book'em Danno," heard and interpreted by other jurors as a 
predetermination of Mr. Brown's guilt, cannot be said to fail to 
erode the confidence in the verdict. Even if somehow those 
statements could fail to erode the confidence of this Court in the 
verdict below surely under the federal constitution's more stringent 
test, the State would be unable to show that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 
23-25. 
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Mr. Brown was denied his state and federal constitutional 
rights to testify in his own behalf; he was denied his state's 
federal constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
These errors mandate that this Court reverse the conviction of 
Mr. Brown and remand the case for a new trial absent such 
constitutional errors. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, as well as those 
articulated in the opening brief, Mr. Brown respectfully requests 
that this Court grant his appeal, reverse his conviction, and remand 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
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